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Automobile Finance, Warranty, and Insurance Extras: What the
Consumer Should Know and How an Attorney Can Attack the
Deceptive Practices
by Daniel G. Deneen

I. INTRODUCTION
Buying a car is usually one of the
largest capital expenditures most consumers make, second only to buying a
home. Despite its significance, consumers usually do not have an attorney
scrutinizing their car purchases to ensure that an automobile dealer has
treated them fairly. While consumers
in recent years have become more savvy
about the tricks of car dealers, most
consumers are still relatively unaware
of how dealerships profit from automobile finance, insurance, and warranty
arrangements. By convincing a car
buyer to use their financing or buy extra
insurance and warranties, automobile
dealerships can add hundreds or even
thousands of dollars to their profits.

While consumers in recent
years have become more
savvy about the tricks of car
dealers, most consumers
are still relatively unaware
of how dealerships profit
from automobile finance,
insurance, and warranty
arrangements.
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The problem is that these finance,
insurance, and warranty deals can be
confusing, complex arrangements that
generally do not violate traditional common or statutory law. As a result, the
consumer law attorney trying to make a
claim against a car dealership must be
creative, drafting the pleadings to allege as many legal theories for recovery
as possible. This article outlines for the
consumer and her attorney how some
of these complex finance, insurance,

and warranty arrangements work and
how an attorney can attack those practices for the benefit of her client.'

The problem is that these
finance, insurance, and
warranty deals can be
confusing, complex
arrangements that generally
do not violate traditional
common or statutory law.

As a general legal principle, a
dealership has not defrauded a buyer if
the consumer pays more than she
"should" have for an automobile, unless the dealer made fraudulent misrepresentations to entice the consumer to
buy the car. The usual dealership tricks,
such as personnel shuffling and loaded
suggestions such as "this car won't be
here tomorrow" or "we have another
customer coming in this afternoon," are
generally not actionable. Additionally,
dealerships often pad their profits with
"add-ons," such as rustproofing. While
these services can be overpriced, a consumer does not usually have a cause of
action arising from the purchase of these
services.
II. FINANCE, WARRANTY AND
INSURANCE OPERATIONS AND
REPRESENTATIVE DECEPTIVE
PRACTICES
A. Finance
Many consumers finance automobile purchases through installment contracts or leases. Consumers should
shop around for independent credit
sources such as banks or credit unions
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priorto purchasing an automobile. The
pre-purchase search for a proper credit
source should assist consumers in determining the dollar amount they can
realistically afford to spend for an automobile. Lenders can also provide some
guidance as to the price consumers
should pay for a particular model and
the approximate wholesale value of the
consumer's trade-in vehicle.
If the customer has not obtained independent financing, automobile
dealerships will assist the customer with
financing. Dealerships have access to
financing through lending institutions
as well as financial affiliates of automobile manufacturers. In many instances, manufacturers offer very low
rates through financial affiliates if customers can meet special conditions.
Even a two percent difference (eight
percent instead of ten percent) in interest rates on a $15,000 automobile loan
for forty-eight months will save consumers $14.25 per month ($366.19 instead of $380.44), or $684.00 over the
course of the loan.
If financing is not procured at special rates provided by an affiliate of the
manufacturer, dealerships can "sell"
executed installment contracts to lending institutions or manufacturers' affiliates at a "buy rate" that varies as
interest rates rise and fall. If an automobile dealership convinces a consumer
to sign an installment contract for more
than the "buy rate," the difference in the
net present value between the contracted
payment amount and what would have
been the payment amount under the
"buy rate" is transferred to a "dealer
reserve account."
Using the previous example, if a
dealership convinced a consumer to
sign an installment contract calling for
ten percent interest and "sold" the contract to a bank at a "buy rate" of eight
percent, its "dealer reserve account"
would be credited with $583.50 at the
time of sale, which is the net present
value of $684.00 discounted at eight
percent. If the installment contract is
subsequently paid off by the buyer,
either when the automobile is traded or
6

after forty-eight months of payments,
the $583.50 in the reserve account is
released to the dealer.
Dealerships do not inform a car buyer
that she will be paying additional funds
each month to a lender to compensate
the lender for the payment to the "dealer
reserve account." The greater the difference between the "buy rate" and the
percentage rate on the installment contracts signed by the consumer, the larger
the undisclosed windfall to the
dealership.
In recent years, leasing an automobile has become a popular alternative to
financing the purchase of a car.
Dealerships often use the same tactics
to profit from leasing transactions as
they do to profit from financing arrangements. Lease payments are calculated based upon the sale price of the
vehicle, the lease period, the value of
the vehicle at the end of the lease period, and an internal interest rate. Before signing a lease, consumers should
always insist that leasing agents,
whether they are private lending institutions or dealerships, disclose all of
the above factors. As with financing,
consumers should make sure that the
automobile dealerships do not profit by
arranging a lease at an internal interest
rate higher than that offered on the
market. Otherwise, the lease arrangement could be very profitable to the
dealership.
B. Service Contracts
Dealerships offer to sell service contracts, extended warranties, or customer
service insurance to supplement standard manufacturers' warranties or to
replace manufacturers' warranties when
they expire. For simplicity, this article
will collectively refer to these arrangements as service contracts.
In theory, service contracts are beneficial because they can provide peace
of mind for the consumer by covering
most of the cost of expensive repairs.
During the service contract period, the
consumer does not have to pay more
than a deductible amount, no matter
how costly the repairs. Although the

overall quality of automobiles is improving, the shift to complex electronic
equipment and the internationalization
of the parts market has made the cost of
repairs increasingly expensive. Electric windows, power seats, automatic
antennas, electronic sensors, and other
parts can cost an exorbitant amount to
repair or replace. These items usually
are not covered under the standard
"drivetrain" warranty, which only covers the engine and transmission. Only
"bumper to bumper" warranties cover
all repairs, including ones to electronic

The conflict of interest
surrounding service
contracts in which the
dealership retains a financial
interest, either directly
through a "special reserve
account" or indirectly
through "kick-backs" or
rebates, is flagrant and
blatant.

devices. Despite the benefits service
contracts appear to confer upon consumers, some contracts also unnecessarily duplicate the manufacturers' express and implied warranties. Generally, as with the price of a car, an inflated price for a service contract cannot be recovered in a lawsuit.
However, consumers may be able to
pursue a legal remedy if they buy a
service contract not offered through the
automobile manufacturer or a truly independent third-party. With this type
of service contract, the dealerships give
customers promotional brochures,
which imply in subtle language that the
service contract is issued by a nationwide, independent network. Administrators handle telephone calls and other
claim reports from customers. But in
reality, the administrator simply acts as
a shell for the dealership. A certain
amount of money is set aside in a reserve account to pay for future repairs.
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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If no or few repairs are made by the
expiration of the service contract, the
dealership receives the money held in
reserve. Because the cost of any repairs
must be transferred from the dealer's
reserve account, the dealership has a
financial incentive to refuse to make
covered repairs or to minimize repair
costs when a customer returns a car to a
dealership with a problem. As a result,
the customer could claim the dealership
had a conflict of interest and engaged in
deceptive practices as the basis for a
cause of action under consumer protection laws.
For example, the Western Diversified Casualty Insurance Company
(Western) has established an extended
service contract network called "The
Advantage Plus." Western provides
dealerships with extended service contract price sheets for new and used
vehicles based upon "class codes" for
each make and model, with variables
depending on mileage, deductibles, and
coverage length. The contractual relationship allows the dealerships to charge
whatever prices consumers are willing
to pay for the contracts, provided that
the listed price is forwarded to Western.

Whenever an aggrieved
consumer has a repair that
has been denied under a
service contract, a consumer
law attorney should always
thoroughly investigate the
service contract network to
discover any undisclosed
arrangements and conflicts
of interest.

In a documented case 2, a customer
paid a dealership $399 for a 24 month/
24,000 mile Advantage Plus extended
service contract on a used Volkswagen
Jetta with 30,000 miles. The dealership
kept $160 as straight profit and forVolume 6 Number 1/Fall 1993

warded $239 to Western. Western retained $55 for an "Excess Loss Premium" to insure the service contract
and part as an administrative fee. The
balance of the funds, $184, was placed
in a "Service Reserve" bank account in
the dealership's name. If no repairs
were necessary to the Jetta by the end of
the service contract, the dealer would
receive the $184, provided the aggregate of its other service contracts did
not exceed the balance of the dealer's
service reserve account.
All service contract networks proceed on an assumption that a high percentage of service contract purchasers
will return to the selling dealerships for
repairs. Reportedly, some service contract networks provide a "kickback" if
proper claim ratios are maintained by a
dealership. Others provide compensation based upon a ratio of net claims to
net sales.
The conflict of interest surrounding
service contracts in which the dealership
retains a financial interest, either directly through a "special reserve account" or indirectly through "kickbacks" or rebates, is flagrant and blatant. If a customer visited a dealership
with a cracked gasket two weeks before
the service contract expired, the
dealership would have a financial incentive to make a temporary repair,
such as putting a pint of sealant into the
system, rather than to make a permanent repair, which would involve the
costly replacement of the gasket. In
contrast, when a dealership repairs a
vehicle under a manufacturer's or truly
independent warranty, the third party
pays for the repairs and the dealership
does not have an incentive not to make
the proper repair.
In consumer litigation, the dealership
and the administrator often both deny
liability. As a result, whenever an aggrieved consumer has a repair that has
been denied under a service contract, a
consumer law attorney should always
thoroughly investigate the service contract network to discover any undisclosed arrangements and conflicts of
interest. Of course, as consumers and

I

their attorneys become more educated
about how these service contracts work,
new and even more ingenious ways in
which dealerships can profit from the
sale of service contracts will spring up
like the heads of the mythical Greek
serpent Hydra.
C. CreditLife and Disability
Insurance
Dealerships also offer credit life and
disability insurance policies, which can
be a source of additional profits to the
dealer. Under these policies, loan payments or outstanding loan balances are
paid if a person becomes disabled or
dies. While these policies do provide a
benefit to the consumer, the cost of the
policies offered through the dealerships
are often quite high in relation to the
small risk of death or disability. Further, if the loan is arranged through the
dealership above the "buy rate," the
profit to the dealership may be further
increased. If the dealership claims that
a consumer must purchase this insurance to obtain a loan, it has made a
fraudulent misrepresentation, and the
consumer would have a cause of action
against the dealership.
III. CONSUMER RELIEF
The consumer law attorney must be
every bit as resourceful at attacking
finance, warranty, and insurance arrangements as automobile dealerships
are at designing schemes to squeeze
hundreds of dollars of extra profit out
of consumers. As illustrated above, the
tactics used by automobile dealerships
are complicated, confusing, and generally do not openly violate commonly
utilized areas of the law. To get through
the courthouse door, the consumer law
attorney must draft her pleadings to
properly allege all legal theories for
recovery. The facts should be set forth
in the pleadings in such a manner that
the dealer's conduct amounts to a breach
of traditional common law theories, if
possible. The complaint should also
allege any possible violations of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty -- Federal
7
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Trade Commission Improvement Act,3
and any applicable statutory consumer
laws available in the jurisdiction.

The consumer law attorney
must be every bit as
resourceful at attacking
finance, warranty, and
insurance arrangements as
automobile dealerships are
at designing schemes to
squeeze hundreds of
dollars of extra profit out of
consumers.

Consumers should expect defendants
to file numerous motions to dismiss
that appear to be valid on their face.
Because Illinois and most other states
allow alternate pleadings, attorneys
should plead enough alternate theories
to ensure that motions judges and defense attorneys understand that one of
the parties will be found liable under
one of the many theories set forth in the
complaint. Although a judge could
technically and properly dismiss one
count, she probably will not dismiss all
counts if the effect would be to deny the
consumer plaintiff relief against all defendants solely because of the manner
in which the defendants set up the transaction.
A. Traditional Methods of Recovery
Manufacturers often deny warranty
claims to customers who try to revoke
acceptance of defective automobiles
even though legally, the consumers
should be allowed to return the vehicle
for a new one. Under Illinois' New
Vehicle Buyer Protection Act, a consumer is entitled to return an automobile during the statutory warranty period4 after four or more unsuccessful
attempts to repair a major problem or
thirty business days in the repair shop.'
While other states have similar laws,
not all provide as much protection as
8

the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act. Therefore, consumer lawyers
should advise clients stuck with "lemons" to proceed first with the non-binding arbitration process under this Act.
If arbitration results are unsatisfactory,
consumers may then file suit under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act to obtain appropriate relief. 6
In the service contract area, consumer law attorneys should file suit
against the dealership, the administrator, and against a joint venture comprising both of them if neither the
dealership nor the administrator will
assume contractual responsibility for
the service contract. Agency law and
third-party beneficiary law within the
jurisdiction should be researched. The
complaint should set forth the responsibilities of each party under all areas of
the law.
The actual warranty documents (such
as a warranty information booklet) may
state, in convoluted language buried in
definitions and other areas, that the
dealership is actually the responsible
party. If the consumer has not received
this document until after the sale of the
service contract, the language in this

Under Illinois'New Vehicle
Buyer Protection Act, a
consumer is entitled to
return an automobile
during the statutory
warranty period after four
or more unsuccessful
attempts to repair a major
problem or thirty business
days in the repair shop.

document should not be allowed to bar
the suit if this fact was not disclosed to
the consumer.'
The lengthy warranty information
booklet is also likely to contain "magic
language"
inserted
by
the
administrator's attorneys in an attempt
to exculpate it from repairs. Warran-

tors will often claim that consumer
misuse or abuse caused a breakdown.
The warrantors may also attempt to
deny coverage if the consumer performed any self-repairs or did not document regular maintenance. As a rule of
thumb, the hastier the "administrator"
is to provide an excuse to deny repairs
without complete examination of the
circumstances, the more culpable the
administrator or dealership is for the
repair.
Additionally, consumers should consider withholding payments to the lender
as a means of relief, as allowed under
federal law. 8 The rule allowing consumers to withhold payments, "was
designed to preserve the consumer's
claims and defenses and restore the
right of nonpayment to the consumer
by eliminating the creditor's holder-indue-course status." 9 The rule also "enables the consumer to assert defenses
and, in some instances, claims against
an assignee-creditor which could previously have only been asserted against
a seller."' 0
B. Uniform CommercialCode
Recovery
Section 2-711 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) can be used if
the provider of a service contract does
not honor the parties' agreement. Consumer law attorneys should argue that
the service agreement should be considered a warranty under Section 2-313
of the U.C.C. Section 2-715 of the
U.C.C. provides for the recovery of
incidental and consequential damages,
which would certainly include the cost
of repairs, if repairs were not made. If
there has been a breach of an express
warranty, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act should be used as a supplement to the U.C.C. because of its more
liberal remedies, which include compensation for the time and inconvenience of making repairs, as well as
attorney fees."
Consumer law attorneys should also
explore the possibility of filing a count
based upon the tort of bad faith breach
of contract. 2 Section 1-203 of the
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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U.C.C., which imposes an obligation of
good faith in the performance of all
contracts and warranties made under
the U.C.C., might be used to pursue
"bad faith" violations of the U.C.C. in
the sale of an automobile or service
contract. Case law in Illinois has
adopted the implied covenant of good
faith in every contract absent express
repudiation.3

C. Equitable, Common Law and
Statutory Consumer FraudRelief
Common law and statutory equitable theories should also be explored.
Attorneys should ask such questions
as: Has there been an unjust enrichment? Can a constructive trust be imposed upon funds in the a dealer reserve
account since the consumer was not
made aware that the dealership was
receiving extra funds? Can one of the
parties be equitably estopped from a
defense because of their prior conduct?
A common law fraud count might
also be attempted. However, the pleading and proof requirements for this
theory are quite burdensome.14
In
contrast, Illinois' Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (Act)
affords broader consumer protection
than the common law action of fraud.
As the Illinois Appellate Court stated in
the recent case of Duran v. Leslie
Oldsmobile,Inc.: "The Consumer Fraud
Act eliminated the requirement of
scienter, and innocent misrepresentations are actionable as statutory fraud.
... Statutory fraud has been held to include misrepresentations of not only
existing material facts, but of future
promises. ... A plaintiff's diligence in

ascertaining the accuracy of misstatements was also eliminated as an element of statutory fraud."' 5
Paragraph 2 of the Act proscribes
not just false statements but "the use or
employment of any deception, fraud,
false pretense, ... misrepresentation or

the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact.' 1 6 Paragraph 2
also proscribes the use or employment of
any practice described in Section 2 of the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.' 7
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The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act has been adopted by at least
twelve states. The prefatory notes to
the Illinois Act state that an important
provision of the Act is subsection 12
which proscribes conduct not specifically enumerated which "similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding. '8 The commentators further state that because the ingenious ways of the unethical businessman have usually been one step ahead
of the law, this provision is essential in
order to assure the objectives of the Act
-- the enjoining of trade practices which
confuse or deceive the consumer. 9
In the service contract example, promotional brochures and salespersons'
representations regarding the warranty
create the likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding concerning the true
party behind the extended service contract and appear to be actionable. An
attorney should also use the Act if any
of the salesperson's actions or the
dealership's written materials are confusing.

If the dealer's overall
scheme, as opposed to the
dealer's actions specific to
a particular consumer, are
the gravamen for the
action, a class action suit
should be considered.

Illinois statutory law states that consideration should be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the federal courts
relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.2" In the financing "kickback" situation described
previously, an FTC decision stated:
"Purchasers should be specifically informed when a seller of an auto gains
financially, i.e., receives a 'kickback',
when he arranges the financing of an
auto."2'
As evidenced by the complex nature

of these claims, an attorney representing a client who has been duped by an
automobile dealership has her work cut
out for her. The courts have become
more generous in awarding substantial
damages for consumer fraud claims.
For example, in Totz v. ContinentalDu
PageAcura,22 the trial court awarded,
and the appellate court affirmed, punitive damages of $5,000 and attorney
fees of $17,625 on a compensatory damages claim of $407.50. However, not
all courts are as liberal when awarding
damages. The Totz court reasoned that
punitive damages were proper because
the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act placed the dealer
on notice that failing to disclose a material fact with the intent that the buyer
rely on the omission could result in
legal action. In addition, the dealer's
conduct was outrageous. Lastly, the
substantial award for attorney fees was
justifiable because the factual and legal
issues involved in the case were com23
plex.
D. Class Action Recovery
If the dealer's overall scheme, as
opposed to the dealer's actions specific
to a particular consumer, are the gravamen for the action, a class action suit
should be considered. Consumer law
attorneys should cite trial courts to the
case of Eshaghi v. Hanley-Dawson
CadillacCo. 24 in motions to certify for
class action suits. The Eshaghi court
stated :
[T]he consumer class action is an
inviting procedural device to cope
with frauds causing small damages to large groups. The slight
loss to the individual, when aggregated in the coffers of the
wrongdoer, results in gains which
are both handsome and tempting.
The alternatives to the class action -- private suits or governmental actions -- have been so

often found wanting in controlling consumer frauds that not even
the ardent critics of class actions
seriously contend that they are
9
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truly effective. The consumer
class action, when brought by
those who have no other avenue
of legal redress, provides restitution to the injured, and deterrence
to the wrongdoer.2 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Automobile dealerships will continue to use a multitude of schemes in
attempting to pry hundreds or even thousands of extra dollars from a consumer's
purchase of a car. When a dealership
has practiced fraud or deception to
achieve extra profit to the detriment of
consumers, the dealership should be
attacked aggressively and relentlessly
by a consumer law attorney. The attorney should use multi-count actions and
discovery, which may reveal questionable business practices by the
dealership. Further, the attorney should
also explore the possibility of class
action litigation.
The consumer law attorney must be
selective in the cases she takes since the
opponents will always be prepared to
offer great resistance and the litigation
will be lengthy and difficult. However,
appropriate financial compensation is
available as illustrated by the Eshaghi
and Totz cases mentioned above.
More importantly, the successful litigant in consumer law litigation receives
the personal satisfaction of having suc-

ceeded in the face of difficult opposition for the benefit of a good cause. 46
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Coupon Clipping Worth
the Effort
Many shoppers are finding that coupon clipping is worth the effort. Shoppers redeemed a record 7.7 billion coupons last year, saving $4.5 billion, according to figures from coupon processor NCH Promotional Services.
Coupon clipping is not for everyone, however. A recent study published in the Journal of Consumer Studies and Home Economics showed that
40 percent of consumers did not reap
savings at least equal to the cost of their
time.
Those who do clip coupons maintain that the habit does not have to be
time-consuming. By finding stores that
double or triple coupons, starting a coupon exchange, and scouting the best
coupon sources, shoppers can save
money and save time.
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